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DOES A MONOPOLIST HAVE A DUTY TO
DEAL WITH ITS RIVALS? SOME
THOUGHTS ON THE ASPEN
SKIING CASE
ARTHUR H. TRAVERS, JR.*
The grant of a petition for certiorari implies that at least four
Justices of the Supreme Court believed that the case raised questions
of general significance. Surely this was true when, on December 3,
1984, the Court granted the petition in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp.' More than a decade had passed since the
Supreme Court had seriously addressed any questions arising under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.2 The ruling definition of the offense of
"'monopolization" was almost twenty years old.' A great deal had
happened during that twenty year period, but perhaps the most signifi-
cant development had been the increased influence of the view that the
primary if not the sole objective of the antitrust laws should be the
promotion of economic efficiency.
Not only had this view gained ascendancy among academic wri-
ters; the Court's decisions, too, had evidenced an increased reliance
upon economic notions, and upon the goal of promoting efficiency.
Many saw a potential conflict between this trend in the Court's think-
ing and the apparent rule of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
(Alcoa)4 and its progeny, which had been criticized as anticompetitive.
The Department of Justice had, for the most part, gotten out of the
Section 2 business, regarding the gains to be achieved far outweighed
by the costs of litigating Section 2 cases. Private treble damage plain-
tiffs, attempting to take over for the government, had been defeated by
several Court of Appeals decisions that, both in result and rationale,
suggested a disenchantment with the Alcoa rule.'
Notwithstanding these developments, the jury in Aspen Skiing,
* I would like to thank my colleagues Homer Clark and Stephen Williams for their comments on
a draft of this paper, and F. Brittin Clayton, University of Colorado Law School, Class of 1986, for
valuable editorial efforts.
1. 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985). Certiorari was granted at 105 S. Ct. 562 (1984).
2. See Otter Tail Power v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
3. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
4. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
5. E.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1093 (1980); Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
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operating under unchallenged instructions, had found that the defend-
ant had monopolized the submarket for downhill skiing in the Aspen
area. The Tenth Circuit had affirmed the district court's decision to
submit the case to the jury, justifying its conclusion by arguing that
the defendant's conduct had deprived the plaintiff of an "essential fa-
cility" and demonstrated an intent to "create or maintain a
monopoly."6
The result seemed in conflict with the trend in recent court of
appeals decisions. The defendant argued that its conduct could be
characterized as "exclusionary" only if a firm with monopoly power
had a duty to cooperate with its competitors. If this view of the deci-
sion were accurate, it could only mean that the Tenth Circuit, by the
use of arresting and provocative theories, had halted the inhumation
of the Alcoa doctrine.
When the Court granted certiorari, most observers, I believe, ex-
pected a reversal and, quite possibly, an opinion that essayed a major
reworking of Section 2 doctrine. It did not quite turn out that way.
All participating Justices7 joined an opinion by Justice Stevens, proba-
bly the most sophisticated antitrust analyst on the Court, that affirmed
the Tenth Circuit. Some lawyers asked whether the decision was not a
"backlash" decision - one that moved counter to most of the Court's
rulings. The opinion is a difficult one to interpret, but it is closer ifi
spirit to recent antitrust jurisprudence than may appear at first. In
this short paper I should like to offer some comments about the deci-
sion and speculations about what it may portend.
The Case
Aspen Skiing Company (Ski Co.) owns and operates three of the
four skiing mountains (Ajax, Buttermilk, and Snowmass) in the Aspen
area. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. (Highlands) owns and operates
the remaining mountain (Aspen Highlands).' In 1962 the three com-
panies then offering downhill skiing in Aspen began marketing an all-
Aspen ticket that permitted the holder to ski on any of the three
Aspen area mountains during the period of the ticket (usually six
days). This practice continued through the opening of the fourth area
at Snowmass and the consolidation of the Ajax, Buttermilk and
Snowmass areas under Ski Co. Initially, this ticket came as a book of
coupons, one for each day, that could be redeemed for a lift ticket at
6. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1518-22 (10th Cir. 1984).
7. Justice White took no part in the decision of the case.
8. This statement of the facts comes from the opinions of the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme
Court.
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any of the mountains. This format had the disadvantage of requiring
the holder to stand in a ticket line each day, but the problem was
corrected by the institution of a ticket that could be hung around the
neck and used at any mountain.
This ticket proved very popular with destination skiers, who typi-
cally travelled a considerable distance to Aspen, who intended to ski
six days, and who valued the convenience and choice the ticket of-
fered. The ticket induced some skiers to ski Aspen who would have
chosen another locale had the ticket been unavailable. Ski Co. and
Highlands divided the revenues and joint advertising expenses associ-
ated with the ticket in proportion to the skiers who skied the various
areas. Over the years they used several different methods to measure
where skiers having an all-Aspen ticket skied. Highlands' percentage
of those skiers, and hence its share of the revenues and costs, fluctu-
ated during the period 1973-1977, ranging from 18.5% in the 1974-75
season to 13.2% in the 1976-77 season.
Ski Co. proposed the continuation of the ticket for 1977-78, with
Highlands receiving a fixed share of 13.2%. Highlands insisted upon
the usage-based allocation scheme; it also argued that its 13.2% for
the preceding year was atypical and not indicative of a downward
trend. Eventually, they agreed to continue the all-Aspen ticket for
1977-78, with Highlands accepting a fixed share of 15%. For the first
time in several years, however, Ski Co. began marketing a three moun-
tain, six day ticket in competition with the all-Aspen ticket. The four
area ticket outsold the three area ticket by two to one.
Ski Co. decided to discontinue the all-Aspen ticket for 1978-79.
It went through the motions of offering Highlands a four area arrange-
ment but insisted that Highlands accept a fixed share so low that
Highlands refused the offer. Ski Co. continued to market its three area
ticket. Highlands attempted to market a multi-area package of its own
but was repeatedly thwarted by Ski Co.'s countermoves. Ski Co. dis-
continued its three day, three area pass (which Highlands could com-
bine with a three day pass of its own to produce a six day package),
and it refused to sell its single day lift tickets to Highlands either at a
tour operator's discount or at retail. When Highlands developed an
"Adventure Pack," which combined a three day pass at Highlands
with coupons redeemable for lift tickets at Ski Co.'s mountains, Ski
Co. refused to accept the coupons, although they presented no credit
risk and were identical to coupons that Ski Co. accepted at its ski areas
outside of Aspen.
Highlands, reduced to a day ski area and with a shrinking share
of the market, sued Ski Co. The district court instructed the jury on
1986]
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the offense of monopolization, using the United States v. Grinnell
formula:
The offense of monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act has
two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.
9
The district court also told the jury that a monopolist has no general
duty to deal with, or aid, its competitors.
Ski Co. did not object to these instructions, but argued that the
case should not be submitted to the jury at all because, as a matter of
law, it had done nothing that would satisfy the conduct element of the
Grinnell test: it had merely refused to cooperate with its competitor
and, as the district court had implied, even a monopolist has no duty
to engage in a joint marketing arrangement with its competitors. Hav-
ing lost at trial and in the Tenth Circuit, Ski Co. pressed these argu-
ments upon the Supreme Court
The Background
Three notions have dominated judicial discussion of the offenses
listed in Section 2 of the Sherman Act: power, conduct, and intent.
Ski Co.'s power was not an issue before the Supreme Court, but it has
long been settled antitrust doctrine that something in addition to mo-
nopoly power must be shown to establish a violation of Section 2.
Early monopolization cases10 rejected the notion that Section 2 pro-
hibits "monopoly in the concrete,"'" that is, that the section was ad-
dressed entirely to a market structure. In those cases, the Court was
not much concerned with the issue of the defendant's power; the anal-
ysis centered upon the defendant's conduct. The conduct condemned
seemed reprehensible or, at least, unnatural.1 2 Where a firm had
gained or maintained its power by the use of such conduct, the firm
had monopolized.
The revolution in Section 2 jurisprudence that began with Judge
9. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). The trial court's paraphrase is,
in turn, paraphrased by the Supreme Court at 105 S. Ct. 2847, 2854.
10. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106 (1911). Cf United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
11. The phrase is Chief Justice White's in Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62.
12. The Standard Oil and American Tobacco companies were both products of the consolidation
of a large number of previously independent firms. Both of Chief Justice White's opinions regarded this
form of growth as unnatural or artificial. Presumably if the firms had evolved entirely by internal
growth it would have been seen as a more natural process, although not necessarily a legal one.
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Hand's opinion in Alcoa did not purport to repudiate the notion that a
firm did not violate Section 2 merely because it possessed an unwhole-
some amount of market power. The various locutions that one finds in
the post-Alcoa, pre-Grinnell decisions all seem to require power plus
conduct, although a close parsing of the opinions will reveal different
implications about what must be shown. 3 In essense, Alcoa and its
successors developed a more sophisticated analysis of the concept of
power, and expanded the definition of "exclusionary conduct." The
idea that the Sherman Act compels the courts to distinguish between
good and bad monopolies on the basis of conduct or intent was a
constant.
There were persuasive reasons for not defining the offense of "mo-
nopolization" entirely in structural terms. The use of the word "mo-
nopolize" in Section 2 suggests a process or course of conduct rather
than a market structure. 4 More fundamentally, a firm may find itself
with monopoly power as a result of circumstances beyond its control.
If the market can only support one efficient firm, condemnation of that
firm may penalize the very efficiencies that we rely on the competitive
process to produce. The conduct element may serve to distinguish
those monopolies that result from superior efficiency from those that
do not. It seems agreed, for example, that the charging of a monopoly
price should not satisfy the conduct element. Such conduct, though
avoidable, is what we would expect from any monopolist, however the
monopoly came to be. It is not the sort of conduct that satisfactorily
distinguishes one monopoly from another.15
Even if efficiency does not require a single firm, the defendant
may have achieved its power by vigorous competition or in other ways
that do not merit condemnation. Section 2 defines a crime, after all,
and treble-damage awards are, to an extent, punitive.' 6 Such penalties
ought not be imposed unless the defendant's avoidable conduct merits
them.
13. The leading opinions are American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
14. As Areeda and Turner point out, the language merely implies that some sort of active partici-
pation by the monopolist is necessary; it does not by itself require any particular type of conduct. III P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 38 (1978).
15. See, e.g., H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 137-38 (1985).
16. Some commentators argue that the treble-damage provisions are deterrent rather than penal.
The underlying notion is that only a portion of the actual offenses will be detected and subjected to
sanctions. If a firm about to engage in conduct that violates the antitrust laws could anticipate that the
likelihood of its being held liable was one in three, it might well proceed if the expected damage award
were not to be trebled. Trebling, however, might prevent the act. But see R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 226-27 (1976), arguing that treble damages are largely unnecessary.
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Finally, to the extent that a court can identify avoidable conduct
that contributed to the acquisition or retention of monopoly power, an
injunction directed to that conduct should be adequate. If the offense
were to be defined entirely in terms of market structure, it would seem
that only a remedy reorganizing the industry would suffice. But struc-
tural relief is expensive and difficult to fashion (if it can be fashioned at
all), and it would raise the social costs of an erroneous judgment
against a defendant, denying consumers, at least for a while, 7 ef-
ficiences resulting from the monopoly.
The trick, therefore, has been to identify the sorts of exclusionary
conduct that a firm with monopoly power must avoid, and the cases,
beginning with Alcoa, have not always handled this task satisfactorily.
In Alcoa, Judge Hand's opinion was unclear about the status of a firm
that achieved or maintained a monopoly by engaging in vigorous but
non-predatory competition. Such a firm could hardly be styled a "pas-
sive beneficiary" of monopoly, or be said to have had "monopoly
thrust upon it," but at the same time it could be described as having
shown "superior skill, foresight, and industry."' 8
Moreover, Judge Hand stressed the exclusionary nature of Al-
coa's record of anticipating increases in the demand for aluminum and
enlarging its capacity to enable it to service this demand as it arose.
Although in theory a firm may design its plant so as to exclude poten-
tial competitors, it is in practice difficult to discern when a firm's in-
vestment in capacity differs from the level to be expected from a profit-
seeking firm unconcerned with forestalling entry. 9 In Alcoa, Judge
Hand did not attempt to show that Alcoa's investment in capacity was
excessive. For all that appears, Alcoa merely wished to avoid tempo-
rary shortages as demand for aluminum increased. To avoid "exclu-
sionary conduct," Alcoa might have had to encourage new entry by
charging high prices, creating shortages, and then remaining passive if
entry occurred. In other words, Alcoa would be encouraged by law to
behave more like the classic monopolist than it had chosen to do. It
was by no means obvious that this would encourage entry and, in the
meantime, consumers would be denied many of the benefits that Alcoa
had elected to provide. This aspect of Alcoa may be partially ex-
17. If monopoly is really inevitable, market forces will simply override any judicial action, unless
the courts engage in a process of ongoing supervision of the market. This would, of course, mean that
the courts persistently interfered with developments that would make the market more efficient.
18. These phrases appear in Judge Hand's Alcoa opinion. 148 F.2d at 429-30.
19. For the theoretical argument, see Spence, Entry, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BELL
J. EcON. 534 (1977); Spence, Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market, 10 BELL J. EON. 1
(1979). For a discussion of the problems of putting theory into practice, see Easterbrook, Predatory
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHL L. REV. 263, 289-97 (1981).
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plained by the fact that Judge Hand did not see efficiency as the pri-
mary goal of the antitrust laws, but this merely states the question: To
the extent that efficiency does become the primary goal of antitrust,
are not the courts compelled to re-examine what the earlier cases have
defined as exclusionary conduct?
Another instance of troublesome identification of exclusionary
conduct is the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Griffith.2°
There the defendant owned movie theatres in a number of towns, some
of which were "closed" in the sense that the defendant's theatre was
the only one in town. Other towns were "open" because the defendant
faced competition from rival movie houses. The defendant was held to
have violated Section 2 because it negotiated with movie distributors
on a system-wide basis, thus linking its closed to its open towns. Pre-
sumably, the defendant's monopolies in the closed towns were "natu-
ral" and hence legal. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court saw the
defendant's bargaining as a way of leveraging the power of the monop-
olies in the closed towns to enable the defendant to drive out its com-
petitors in the open towns. Since distributors had no choice but to use
the defendant if they wished to exhibit movies in the closed towns,
they would be compelled to select the defendant as their exhibitor in
the open towns as well.
Assuming the Court was right in its apprehensions, 2' the question
remains: What was to be done about it? The Court could, of course,
order the defendant to bargain separately for its closed and for its open
towns. This would leave the defendant with monopoly power in the
closed towns, and the defendant could use that power to bargain down
the price that it had to pay the distributors for the films it exhibited in
the closed towns. It could then use the money that it saved to outbid
its rivals in the open towns. How could this be prevented? Ordering
the defendant not to use its monopoly power to get a lower price for
the closed towns would be tantamount to ordering a monopolist not to
20. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
21. Many commentators have argued that this leverage theory suffers from serious theoretical
defects. Where the markets are related, there may be no advantage to the monopolist in gaining a
second monopoly. If, for example, in a tying arrangement the tied product and the tying product are
used in fixed proportions by the purchaser, the monopolist can gain the maximum profit from its mo-
nopoly of the tying product. Even if the monopolist could gain by obtaining a second monopoly, it may
not be as easy to obtain as the theory often suggests. In Griffith, for instance, the distributors of films
benefitted from competition in the open towns. They therefore would not look with equanimity upon
the defendant obtaining monopolies there. Hence, the distributors could be expected to bargain with
the defendant in attempts to extract price concessions from him that might compensate them for future
losses, if and when the defendant achieved additional local monopolies. Whether the anticipated gains
from achieving monopolies in the now open towns would counterbalance these concessions cannot be
determined in the abstract. The point, however, is that even in a case like Griffith the monopolist may
not wish to engage in "leveraging."
1986]
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charge the monopoly price. A court could hardly order the defendant
not to outbid its rivals in the open towns without stifling competition.
Could a court allow the defendant to outbid its rivals so long as the
bidding was not financed by profits from the closed towns? This
would seem to involve the courts in the task of supervising how a mo-
nopolist spent its money, and courts appear ill-equipped to undertake
this type of supervision.
Decisions such as these raised the question whether the mere pos-
session of monopoly power constituted a violation of Section 2, despite
the judicial pronouncements and the arguments against such a rule. If
the conduct element can be found in behavior that appears competitive
or in behavior that seems implicit in the market structure, like monop-
oly pricing, then power alone makes out the offense. Once the defend-
ant acquires monopoly power it can avoid condemnation, if at all, only
by being inefficient.
Of particular interest here were cases holding or suggesting that
the conduct element of Section 2 might be satisfied by a monopolist's
refusal to deal. United States v. Colgate & Co.,22 that venerable deci-
sion establishing the right of a firm to choose with whom it will deal,
said the right existed "in the absence of any purpose to create or main-
tain a monopoly." In Lorain Journal Co. v. United States23 the sole
newspaper in Lorain, Ohio, refused to accept advertising from anyone
who also advertised on the radio station in neighboring Elyria, and the
Supreme Court held that Section 2 had been violated.24 In Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States25 the Court condemned as a violation of
Section 2 the refusal of a power company that had a monopoly of
transmission lines either to supply power it generated, or to "wheel"
power generated by others to municipally-owned retail systems.
As the district court in Aspen Skiing instructed the jury, this mis-
cellany of holdings still did not amount to a general duty of a monopo-
list to deal with all comers. The courts had rejected the notion that
the Sherman Act transformed monopolies into public utilities and
courts into regulatory agencies. But just as plainly did they establish
that a monopolist's right to choose its customers was subject to limits
that did not similarly circumscribe a non-monopolist. The problem
22. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
23. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
24. Technically, the charge in Lorain Journal was that the defendant attempted to monopolize,
but nothing should turn on this distinction. The defendant would not have been able to put any pres-
sure on the advertisers had it not possessed monopoly power. In any case, if the defendant's behavior
satisfies the conduct element of "attempt to monopolize" (where there need be less power), it should
also suffice for "monopolization."
25. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
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was to define those limits in a way that neither required inefficient
behavior by the monopolist nor imposed upon the courts the task of
overseeing the monopolist's deals and negotiations. If a monopolist
sets a single price to all buyers, and offers no discounts, it will thereby
"refuse to deal" at any lower price, or with those who will not meet
the price asked. Even if the price set is a monopoly price, this sort of
"refusal" cannot be the basis of an antitrust violation. Moreover, even
a monopolist must have some latitude to decline dealings that it ex-
pects to be unprofitable. The lone bank in a small town cannot be
under a duty to extend credit to a notorious deadbeat.
On the other hand, the refusal to deal in Lorain Journal seems
unjustified. A decree ordering the defendant not to discriminate might
readily be drafted, and the Court might well have been disinclined to
overrule that case. If Aspen Skiing required the Court to do no more
than reaffirm Lorain Journal, the Court would need to give some
thought to how this "duty to deal" could be defined to prevent its
becoming "general."
Perhaps the third notion, "intent," might serve to distinguish per-
missible from forbidden refusals to deal. Preliminarily, one must dif-
ferentiate specific intent, which has traditionally been an element of an
attempt to monopolize, from general intent, which is all Judge Hand
required to establish a monopolization claim.26 The latter is nothing
more than the intent to do the acts that constitute the conduct element
of the monopolization offense. Plainly, where the intent that must be
shown is general intent, this element tends to disappear, but the same
is often true in practice where specific intent must be shown in theory.
If a monopolist's lawyer is on his toes, there will be no embarassing
documents proclaiming the firm's intent to destroy its competition.
Specific intent must be inferred from conduct. Proof of exclusionary
conduct, then, is the basis of a finding of either kind of intent. More-
over, to the extent that the same behavior supports an inference of
"specific" as well as "general" intent, any distinction between these
tends to evaporate in practice.
Even if rummaging through the monopolist's files unearthed
damaging documents, what would that prove? Suppose the firm's
board formally resolved to make a product so superior to any competi-
26. In Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905), Justice Holmes found that an
attempt to monopolize was like other criminal attempts, requiring both a specific intent and a danger-
ous probability of success. Conceivably, a distinction between general and specific intent might be
made in terms of the kinds of acts that the defendant intended to do, but if so, presumably fewer acts
would be consistent with a "specific intent to monopolize" than would be consistent with the sort of
general intent that Judge Hand was talking about. Pursuit of this idea is not one of my objectives in
this paper.
1986]
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tive product that the firm would corner the market. Surely, no court
should condemn on such a basis. When we speak of specific intent to
monopolize, we mean the specific intent to control the market by em-
ploying tactics that are improper. Hence, the analysis of intent always
comes back to conduct and to the need to define what sorts of acts are
forbidden to a monopolist. If the act in question is a refusal to deal,
under what circumstances will such a refusal amount to exclusionary
conduct?
Prior to Aspen Skiing the whole notion of predatory or exclusion-
ary conduct had been subjected to thorough academic examination.27
Most of the writing focused on predatory pricing and the problem of
devising tests that could distinguish predatory pricing from vigorous
price competition. 28 Although no consensus emerged about the test to
be employed, there was considerable agreement about other points.
Most commentators agreed that real world incidents in which preda-
tory conduct was employed to monopolize were rare. Since there is a
social cost when vigorous competition is condemned as predatory, the
commentators, for the most part, opted for a narrow definition of
predatory conduct. To the extent that this might allow actual preda-
tion to escape, there is a cost to this option as well, but since most
believed actual predation to be rare, the cost seemed tolerable.29 One
commentator, Professor (now Judge) Easterbrook, went so far as to
conclude that we would be better off without such a doctrine: the costs
of an erroneous judgment that conduct was predatory plus the costs of
identifying such conduct outweighed the costs of sporadic, successful
predation.3" But a rule of "per se legality" for all exclusionary con-
duct would require a major rethinking of Section 2. If we were to
jettison the idea of exclusionary conduct, would monopolization be-
come a structural offense? Or would Section 2 simply cease to be
effective?
The Aspen Skiing case put before the Court basic questions about
the role of the concept of "exclusionary conduct" in an efficiency-ori-
ented antitrust law. Since the case itself involved a refusal to deal, an
observor asked to predict the outcome of the case might have an-
27. The stimulus for the most recent outpouring was Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). A good bibliogra-
phy is in Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 263 n.1. Many of these articles are reproduced in 10 J. RE-
PRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 1-413 (1980).
28. See, however, the catalog of non-pricing exclusionary conduct in H. HOVENKAMP, supra note
16, at 146-58.
29. Predatory techniques other than predatory pricing, to the extent that they can be defined,
might not merit such lenient treatment. Cf Salop & Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. EcON.
REV. 267 (1983).
30. Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 318-33.
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swered that she expected a sharper definition of the circumstances in
which a monopolist's refusal to deal would be impermissible, a nar-
rower definition of "exclusionary conduct," and ultimately a more
limited offense of monopolization.
What Did the Supreme Court Do?
Because the Court's unanimous affirmance is so different from
those expectations, one may be tempted to give the case a narrow in-
terpretation. It could be argued that the Court did no more than de-
cide an issue of fact: Ski Co. behaved badly. It may be argued further
that any propositions of law implicit in this decision can be found in
the Lorain Journal case. Consider the following propositions, all of
which might be thought to have been established by Lorain Journal
(and the other precedents).
1. There is a class of conduct in which a firm with monopoly
power may not engage. This conduct we call "exclusionary." A mo-
nopolist engaging in such conduct violates Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
2. A monopolist's refusal to deal may, under certain circum-
stances, be deemed exclusionary conduct. If the effect of the monopo-
list's refusal is the exclusion or disadvantage of a competitor (or
potential competitor), the monopolist must offer a justification for the
refusal.
3. The obligation to justify its refusal does not amount to any
general duty on the part of a monopolist to deal with its competitors
(or any one else), but it does expose the monopolist to the risk that its
justification will be considered unsatisfactory. Ex ante the monopolist
must weigh the cost of dealing against the expected cost of not
dealing.3'
The specific issue in Aspen Skiing was whether a reasonable jury
might have determined that Ski Co.'s conduct was exclusionary. This
was translated into the question: Could a reasonable jury have re-
garded Ski Co.'s proffered justifications inadequate? The lion's share
of Justice Stevens' opinion is given over, not to a discussion of legal
doctrine, but to an analysis of the evidence relating to those justifica-
tions. All eight participating Justices agreed that a reasonable jury
might have disbelieved Ski Co.'s ostensible fears about the techniques
used to monitor usage and its other justifications. Hence it is arguable
31. To the extent that the monopolist's behavior might be affected by the anticipation of such
costs, one might see a "duty" of a general sort. To be sure, the cost is less than would be expected if the
refusal to deal were automatically subjected to antitrust penalties. But to the extent the probability that
the monopolist's justification will be rejected approaches one, these two costs converge.
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that the Court affirmed the decision below on an ad hoc basis and
deferred the task of revising Section 2 doctrine to another day. Under
this view, the Court failed to address the issues that seemed important
to those voting for certiorari.
But this interpretation glosses over some real difficulties. Ski Co.
argued that the case should not have been submitted to the jury at all.
It asked the Court to adopt a general rule that a monopolist need
never have direct dealings with its competitors. Lorain Journal, after
all, did not present the situation of a monopolist refusing to deal with
its competitor, and the preceding analysis smooths over this distinc-
tion without assessing its merits. Ski Co. offered the Court one way of
defining the circumstances in which a monopolist's refusal to deal
might be deemed exclusionary, and the Court rejected it.
Both the refusal and the Court's justification for it deserve com-
ment. The Tenth Circuit had upheld the verdict by invoking both the
"essential facilities" doctrine32 and the language of Colgate,33 quoted
above, about a "purpose to create or maintain a monopoly." The
Tenth Circuit appeared to invoke these notions as rules, to be applied
more or less easily to the facts before it. Although it rejected Ski Co.'s
exculpatory rule, it countered with rules of its own.
But neither satisfactorily resolved the Aspen Skiing case. As
noted earlier, "intent" adds nothing to conduct. Ski Co. plainly in-
tended to engage in the conduct to which Highlands objected; the is-
sue was whether Ski Co. might freely engage in such conduct. There
is, however, no analysis of the effect of that conduct in the Tenth Cir-
cuit's opinion. As far as the "essential facilities" doctrine is con-
cerned, even the use of the word "doctrine" is a bit grandiose. A
handful of cases have found that the exclusion of a firm from a joint
venture controlled by the firm's competitors can be a violation of the
Sherman Act,34 but the exact scope of these precedents is far from
clear. Apparently, the joint venture must supply an essential input
that is not readily available elsewhere. Those precedents cannot be
applied to a single-firm monopolist's refusal to deal without a search-
ing analysis.35 For one thing, a monopolist is always, in some sense,
the sole source of whatever it supplies. If, in a given case, that product
could be classified as "essential," the monopolist might be under a
32. 738 F.2d at 1520-21.
33. Id. at 1521-22. It probably goes without saying that the language was dictum in Colgate. See
250 U.S. at 307.
34. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
35. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 14, at 272-76, concluding that a single-firm monop-
olist's refusal to deal should not be proscribed by Section 2.
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general duty to deal. Moreover, it is often more difficult for a court to
fashion relief in the single firm case than it is in the joint venture situa-
tion.3 6 These factors do not necessarily render the essential facilities
doctrine useless to a court confronted with a refusal to deal by a single
firm monopolist; they do argue for a more careful analysis than the
Tenth Circuit offered.
Justice Stevens' approach is quite different from this rule-oriented
method, and it seems quite consistent with at least the first of two
major trends of the Court's recent antitrust jurisprudence. First, the
Court has moved away from rules that determine the legality or ille-
gality of a challenged practice by locating the defendant or the prac-
tice within a larger class of actors or practices. Instead, the Court has
favored a particularized evaluation of each practice under a general
standard.37 A noteworthy example of this was Continental T. V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc.," in which the Court rejected the notion that a
manufacturer's territorial confinement of its dealers could be con-
demned as per se illegal.39 Convinced that a particular restriction
might be either pro- or anti-competitive, the Court opted for a case by
case analysis under the Rule of Reason.
This approach has also been evident in cases narrowing or repudi-
ating certain antitrust immunities. In National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States' the Court rejected the hardy myth that
"professions" are exempt from the antitrust laws. In Community
Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder4 the Court held that the
immunity from antitrust liability enjoyed by the states does not extend
to municipalities. Decisions like these have effectively subjected a
whole new set of activities to scrutiny under the Rule of Reason.
Thus, in some instances the Court has placed at risk defendants who
had thought themselves immune, while in others it has provided
greater freedom for firms to engage in practices previously thought
illegal. This aspect of the Court's jurisprudence has by no means been
uniformly pro-business. The constant has been the movement from
36. Id. See also R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 211.
37. A classic exposition of the distinction is in H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 155-
58 (tent ed. 1958).
38. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
39. In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the Court had held that such
territorial confinement, with respect to goods that the dealers had purchased, was illegal per se. The
case was consistent with the earlier decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373 (1911), holding resale price maintenance illegal per se. In an interesting recent case the Court
declined the invitation to adopt a rule of per se legality for vertical restraints. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
40. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
41. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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the use of rules toward the use of standards. The opinion in Aspen
Skiing is entirely consistent with this evaluation. It rejects the rule-
like justification offered by Ski Co., as well as the rule-like analysis of
the Tenth Circuit. A monopolist's refusal to deal and its proferred
justification are now to be judged under a general standard.
But squaring the decision with the second trend - the explicit
use of the notion of economic efficiency to define these standards - is
a more difficult task. The trend itself has been less clear than the first.
In Professional Engineers, for example, the Court rejected the idea that
an anticompetitive restriction could be justified by showing that it
served some social goal other than efficiency.42 Some other decisions
might be thought contrary to this trend.43 But if the decisions are not
completely harmonious, the Court has been striving to purge its analy-
sis of factors other than economic efficiency. Indeed, the shift from
rules to standards is related to this. It is difficult to articulate rules
that do not either condemn efficient behavior or allow inefficient be-
havior. At the same time, the comparative vagueness of the general
standard can create uncertainty about the legal status of certain prac-
tices and, perhaps, deter desirable conduct. It thus becomes even
more important that the Court apply the standards accurately and
clearly. For example, in Aspen Skiing the Court's task was to apply its
general standard to a monopolist's refusal to deal in such a way as to
guide and direct future behavior. The Court's handling of this task
was not all that might be desired.
The Court first assessed the effects of the refusals to deal on High-
lands, on consumers, and on Ski Co. itself. It found that Ski Co. had
effectively denied consumers a product that actual buying patterns had
shown to be preferred over the three area, six day pass that Ski Co.
offered as an alternative. By preventing Highlands from developing
any sort of multi-area ticket, it had seriously impaired Highlands' abil-
ity to compete for destination skiers. Finally, by forgoing profitable
transactions, Ski Co. was imposing costs upon itself, presumably be-
cause these costs would be more than recouped when Ski Co. suc-
ceeded in gaining control of the Aspen submarket.
Thus far, the Court had done little to define the monopolist's
42. The defendants had claimed that competitive bidding by engineers would lead to deceptively
low bids. To put the best interpretation on this argument, they were contending that the purchasers'
lack of information about engineering services would induce them to accept bids so low that quality
would be below minimum standards. The Supreme Court felt that purchasers could be depended upon
to inform themselves adequately.
43. Some commentators believe the decision in Arizona v. Maricopa Cy. Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332 (1982), to be anti-competitive. In that case the Court condemned as illegal per se a horizontal
agreement fixing maximum prices for medical services.
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"duty" to deal. A monopolist refusing to deal always imposes costs
upon itself (in the form of profits forgone), and it always denies cus-
tomers something they would like. If the effect is also to disadvantage
competitors, the conduct may be labelled exclusionary. This was al-
ready implicit in Lorain Journal. Moreover, this analysis does not dis-
tinguish between Ski Co.'s refusal to market the all-Aspen ticket and
its refusals to sell day tickets to Highlands and to accept Highlands'
coupons. In effect the Court's analysis imposes at least a duty to ex-
plain a refusal, even if the spurned party is a competitor, and it makes
no attempt to limit this duty to explain to a defined subset of refusals.
If the opinion fails to impose a general duty to deal, it is because the
Court leaves open the possibility that a monopolist's proffered justifi-
cation for a refusal will be found satisfactory. To the extent that a
monopolist can anticipate that its justification is certain to be ac-
cepted, the situation is much the same as it would be if there were no
duty to explain at all (ignoring the costs of explaining). Since the
Court rejected Ski Co.'s justification, the case does not establish any
justifications as "safe." Nevertheless, the Court might have explained
its rejection in terms that could guide future defendants. A clear state-
ment of the deficiencies of Ski Co.'s position might have helped future
defendants supply what was missing in Aspen Skiing.
Ski Co. attempted to show that there were costs attached to deal-
ing with Highlands, but it failed to convince the jury or, apparently,
the Court. Although it professed reservations about the method that
had been used to monitor usage in connection with the four area
ticket, Ski Co. was willing to employ such methods at other ski locales
where it had joined with its rivals in offering multi-area tickets. Of
course, those were locales in which Ski Co. was not the dominant firm.
Moreover, Ski Co. offered no explanation of its refusal to accept the
Adventure Pack coupons or of its refusal to sell its day tickets to High-
lands at retail (beyond the argument, previously discussed, that no re-
fusal to deal with a competitor could be objectionable). In effect, the
Court was presented with a refusal to deal by a monopolist, the effect
of which was to disadvantage a competitor, for which no explanation
was offered. Ski Co. seems to have gambled everything on the notion
that a refusal to deal with a competitor need not be explained. Once
that idea was rejected, there was little upon which to fall back. The
Court had no occasion to analyze the deficiencies in a particularized
justification, since none was before it. But the effect is that the opinion
provides few clues about how the defendant in a future case might
justify its refusal.
There is no suggestion in the Court's opinion, for example, that
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the monopolist will ever be spared the duty to explain his refusal. And
there is an aspect of the Court's analysis that suggests that any refusal
can be risky. As noted, the opinion tends to lump together all of Ski
Co.'s conduct. This may be understandable given the way the case
was presented to the Court (as a course of conduct tending to exclude
Highlands, for which no real justification was offered), but the failure
to distinguish between Ski Co.'s refusal to market the all-Aspen ticket
and its refusal to provide Highlands with day tickets at its established
price is troublesome.
The latter seems like the refusal in Lorain Journal: a refusal by a
seller to sell a standardized commodity to some buyers at the price at
which it was willing to sell the commodity to all others. In contrast,
the refusal to market the all-Aspen ticket is a refusal to enter an ongo-
ing relationship. It seems closer to the refusal of the defendant in Ot-
ter Tail to provide electricity to the municipal utilities. But that case
was peculiar in the sense that the relationship, once established, could
be monitored by an administrative agency instead of a court."
Ski Co. alluded repeatedly to what it called a "free rider prob-
lem" in its relationship with Highlands.45 The Court seemed unper-
suaded that this could exist if an accurate, usage-based scheme of
allocating the costs and revenues were employed, but this is not cer-
tain. Suppose Ski Co. and Highlands were dividing the costs and reve-
nues pro rata and it was determined that 17% of the skiers used
Highlands. Ski Co. gets 83% of the profit. Of course, with respect to
its three area, six day ticket, it gets 100% of the profit. The issue from
Ski Co.'s point of view is whether 83% of the all-Aspen ticket profit is
more or less than 100% of the profit from its own three area ticket.
The Court noted that the all-Aspen ticket outsold the three area
ticket by two to one when they were offered as alternatives, but this
means little without knowledge of the relative prices of the two tickets.
44. In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), the Court was able to lateral
the ball to the Federal Power Commission, through which the limited duty to deal could be adminis-
tered. This fact alone suffices to limit that case. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 14, at 239-
41.
45. A free rider is a person who benefits from a good without paying for those benefits. In Conti-
nental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Court was persuaded that territorial
restrictions might be imposed by a manufacturer who wished to prevent dealers from taking a free ride
on point-of-sale services provided by another dealer. For example, a dealer in complicated audio equip-
ment might provide instruction to potential customers only to have the now-educated customer
purchase the equipment at a discount house down the street that provided no such services. Point-of-
sale services increased consumer welfare, but the dealer who was being undercut could not continue to
offer them. Since the Court believed that territorial restrictions imposed to correct a free rider problem
were efficient, it believed that such restrictions could not be condemned on their face. See generally
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U.
Cm. L. REV. 1 (1977).
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Unless the all-Aspen ticket can be sold at a sufficiently high premium
(or lure a sufficient number of additional skiers), Ski Co. might do
better with its own ticket. To put the point slightly differently, the fact
that 17% of those holding an all-Aspen ticket chose to ski Highlands
does not necessarily indicate that the ticket would bring in enough
additional profit to compensate Ski Co. for its payment of Highlands'
share. Nor does Ski Co.'s willingness to engage in a joint arrangement
elsewhere necessarily indicate anything about Aspen. Skiers plainly
like the variety of a multi-area ticket, but it may not be in the interest
of a firm that can offer a three area ticket to join with another firm
merely to add a fourth area.
Any collaboration among firms in marketing a product that can-
not be produced by any single firm presents this problem of dividing
the profits attributable to the joint product - of saying just how much
each firm contributed.46 If the parties agree to a scheme for dividing
these profits, then we may presume each believes it is better off with
the joint arrangement than without it. There is no such presumption,
however, when a court must coerce one of the parties into entering the
arrangement. The court must then take upon itself the task of allocat-
ing the profits. To the degree that the method chosen is inaccurate,
the firm coerced into the arrangement may be deprived of profits that
rightfully belong to it.
When a judicially imposed duty to deal involves a court in what
Judge Posner describes as "the detailed and continuous supervision of
an ongoing commercial relationship,"4 the court is taking on a task
that can be onerous enough without the court also having to decide on
the value of each firm's marginal contribution to the joint product.
But the Supreme Court appears to say in Aspen Skiing that it will take
on such a task, if the monopolist does not convince the Court that a
rival is attempting to gain a free ride on the monopolist's contribution.
The mere fact that a joint arrangement might produce this result is not
enough to deter the Court.
The Court would have been better advised to limit its condemna-
tion of Ski Co.'s behavior to Ski Co.'s refusals to deal with Highlands
on the same basis that it was willing to deal with others. The Court
46. Cf the discussion of divided interests in land in R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
63-66 (3d ed. 1986). Any ongoing arrangement, if not well designed, can pose a problem of one party
free-riding upon the contribution of the other. This is true even if the arrangement is entered volunta-
rily. If it is entered voluntarily, then presumably each firm (or party) receives initially at least what it
would have received if it had deployed its contribution in its next best use, but each party may not
always be able to reap the full benefit of contributions that it makes later. Presumably the freedom to
disentangle oneself from an arrangement that has become onerous is the best protection against being
exploited.
47. R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 211.
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might have declined to treat Ski Co.'s refusal to market the all-Aspen
ticket as not requiring any justification, not because such refusals are
always pro-competitive, but because the Court is not well-equipped to
police such ongoing arrangements or to be certain that it is not impos-
ing or inducing inefficient behavior on or by the firms involved.48
The refusals of Ski Co. to sell day tickets or accept Highlands'
Adventure Pack coupons do not appear to present this problem. As in
Lorain Journal, the defendant established its price and was willing to
accept all comers at that price until the refusals in question. In neither
case could the defendant offer a plausible reason for the refusal. In
both, a court order commanding the defendant to deal at its estab-
lished price would be easy to draft and might not involve any ongoing
supervision.
This is not to say that there are no problems with imposing even
so limited a duty to deal. For example, Highlands evidently attempted
to secure day tickets from Ski Co. at the tour operator's discount. Ski
Co.'s refusal was of little significance because it had also refused to sell
tickets to Highlands at the retail price. Had it been willing to sell to
Highlands at retail but not at a discount, however, the Court would
have had to evaluate Ski Co.'s reasons for that refusal. This could
involve the Court in the same kind of difficulties that existed under the
Robinson-Patman Act when a defendant offered a cost justification for
discriminatory pricing.49
The Court should also be cautious about taking on the job of re-
viewing pricing decisions or price structures. For example, Highlands
complained when Ski Co. increased its standard price for a single day
ticket, making it unprofitable for Highlands to include them in its
multi-area package. It may have been the case, however, that Ski Co.
increased the price of its day ticket because it was profitable for it to
do so, wholly apart from any impact that it might have had on High-
lands. As noted earlier, monopoly pricing simpliciter cannot be
deemed "exclusionary" conduct without eliminating the conduct ele-
ment from the monopolization offense. But courts are ill-equipped to
determine if a price increase, such as Ski Co.'s, represents anything
more than a response to changed conditions that have raised the
profit-maximizing price, or if the increase was greater than profit-seek-
ing considerations would indicate. The problem is analogous to the
problem of determining if a price decrease is predatory, but without
the assistance afforded by the monopolist's cost information.
48. To the extent that Highlands gets a share of any increased profits resulting from improve-
ments in Ski Co.'s areas, Ski Co. has a reduced incentive to improve them. This is merely one example.
49. A good introduction to cost justification is L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 700-01 (1977).
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The implication of this analysis is that the Court should find a
refusal to deal by a monopolist to be exclusionary only under narrowly
defined circumstances. The refusal to enter some sort of joint venture
should not entail the risk of a finding of monopolization. Likewise the
monopolist should have considerable latitude in setting its prices.
Only a refusal to sell a standardized commodity at its established price
should trigger a duty to explain on the part of the monopolist.
The Court could move to this position without being seriously
embarassed by Aspen Skiing. The Court has left open the possibility
that some future defendant may be able to succeed in convincing the
Court that the plaintiff does seek to gain a free ride on the monopo-
list's contribution or that the risk of such a free ride is high. In this
case Highlands introduced a great deal of evidence that showed that
its area was of the same high quality as those of Ski Co. - that it did
not need to piggy-back on anyone's reputation. The Court found Ski
Co.'s arguments to the contrary unpersuasive. The record in future
cases may well look very different. The critical question in future
cases will be what sort of evidence the Court will accept as adequate to
justify a monopolist's refusal to enter a joint venture. Under Aspen
Skiing, the mere assertion that a "free rider" problem exists is not
enough, but a persuasive blend of theoretical and empirical arguments
might well carry the day in future litigation. To the extent that the
Court is willing to accept some justifications routinely, it may move
toward dispensing with the duty to explain in most cases.
This raises a final question: If the Court is to define an exclusion-
ary refusal to deal so narrowly, would it not be better for the Court to
go all the way and adopt at least part of Judge Easterbrook's advice?
Would it not be better to hold that no refusals to deal can satisfy the
conduct requirement of Grinnell? I think not. Real predation may
indeed be rare, but that is no reason to tolerate it when it can be read-
ily identified and proscribed. The Court has imposed the burden on a
monopolist of justifying a refusal to deal, but it is free to accept plausi-
ble justifications when they are presented. If a monopolist can offer
no such justification, there is no reason to exonerate it. Until Congress
repeals or amends Section 2 of the Sherman Act, courts are not free to
read the offense of monopolization out of the law.
Conclusion
The Court in Aspen Skiing moved cautiously. It did not eviscer-
ate Section 2. It did not throw out the notion of exclusionary behav-
ior. It did not expand the freedom of a monopolist to refuse to deal,
but it did continue to move away from rules and toward the use of
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standards in evaluating business behavior under the antitrust laws. It
appears to have continued the approach of Alcoa and its progeny of
condemning as exclusionary conduct that may well have been compet-
itive, but this may be an illusion, resulting from the way in which the
case was presented and perceived. The Justices were simply unwilling
to accept as a justification for a refusal to deal the argument that deal-
ing would have benefitted the monopolist's rival. But the way is open
in the future for the Justices to accept more firmly grounded justifica-
tions for refusals to deal. The way is still open as well for a re-exami-
nation of the theory of monopolization. The Court moved cautiously,
but it did move. And it did not change direction.
